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ABSTRACT
WHY LATINAS SWING LEFT:
Ideological Self-Identification in Conservative Chile
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KristynA. Call
University of New Hampshire, May, 2009
As recently as 2006, Latin American citizens have shifted to the left ideologically.
This study begins by exploring the ideological orientation of women in socially
conservative Chile. After analyzing existing literature on gender and ideology, this study
goes on to suggest what has led Chilean women to ideologically self-identify to the left.
Using a combination of case study analysis and Latin America Public Opinion Project
analysis, this thesis proposes that specific social demographics, attitudes toward social
issues, the economy, and government intervention are related to the ideological
orientation of women. This study focused on multivariate ordinary least squares
regression model analysis to evaluate the suggested hypotheses. Additionally, this thesis
will address the implications an ideological shift to the left may have on Chilean society

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Recently, Latin Americans have drifted slightly to the left of the ideological
pendulum This shift in ideological identification is unusual, as in the past Latin
Americans have tended to position themselves to the right of the ideological spectrum
compared to other global regions. Recently, however, the region has witnessed a rise of
left-wing presidents such as Chavez of Venezuela, Correa of Ecuador, Morales of
Bolivia, and Bachelet in Chile. While this shift may be slight, in some cases, it is a drift
with consequences. Seligson finds that a leftist ideological orientation in most Latin
American countries is strongly correlated with an unfavorable view of democratic
governance and less support for civil rights and civil liberties As a result of the lack of
confidence Latin American citizens have for democratic institutions, "populist" leaders
have been given the go ahead to take control.2 Seligson finds that the problem with
populism is its association with a belief that democracy, and democratic institutions, are
ineffective and inefficient expressions of the "people's will." Instead, populist leaders
carry out their own will, crushing dissent and curbing people's rights and civil liberties.3

1

Seligson (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," Journal ofDemocracy vol. 18
no.3pg.83.
2
Seligson (2007).
3
Seligson(2007).

1

Chile has proven to be an exception in this trend. Seligson found that a shift to
the left in Chile corresponded to support for democracy, civil liberties, and democratic
institutions. This finding is reaffirmed by politics at the national level, when in an
unusual turn of events, centre -left candidate Michelle Bachelet became Chile's first
woman president running on a platform for social change, also advocating close ties to
the United States and free trade. Bachelet came out on top by "attracting" liberal voters
who had leftist ideological preferences.4
A liberal ideological orientation in Chile is surprising in a country known for its
deeply entrenched social conservatism. Historically, men and especially women in Chile
have strongly identified with social conservatism. Seligson's research found that an
adherence to social conservatism is no longer the norm in Chile Social conservatism,
once so entrenched within Chilean society, has been gradually replaced with a preference
for liberal ideology. This study will examine such trends more closely, focusing on
women's ideological orientation.
Historically, Chilean women have been typecast as staunch conservatives.
Conservative parties have been the groups that have aimed to incorporate women into the
political processes. Although Chilean women were not granted the right to vote until
1935, in 1917 the Conservative Party in Chile called for a law to be passed extending the
right to vote to Chilean women.5 Conservative parties sought to increase women's
participation in politics because they believed that by doing so it would increase support
for their causes. Indeed, the incorporation of women into politics strengthened traditional
4

Seligson (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," Journal ofDemocracy vol. 18
no.3pg. 83.
5
Power, Margaret (1953) Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56.
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gender roles, rather than challenging them. For example, conservative values were
strongly emphasized by the conservative party, and when women lent their support to the
conservative party they were in essence supporting the value of limited rights for women
in the workplace and in the public sphere.
Salvador Allende became the first democratically elected Marxist president of
Chile in 1970 running on a platform of nationalization and "radical" social reform.
However, the three years of Allende's rule were wrought with tension. Running under a
socialist platform oriented for the workers of Chile, Allende faced increasing distrust and
alienation from the middle class and from the United States. The middle class came to
view Allende and his government as a threat to Chilean society leading to demonstrations
from the Chilean populous.
Women featured prominently in the opposition to Allende. During the second
presidential term of Allende, right- wing women's groups marched against the
government of Allende. Women took to the streets of Chile on December 1, 1971
ushering in the beginning of a "mass opposition movement." Most fascinating in regards
to the large scale women's opposition movement was the ability of conservative leaders
to "appeal" to women as both wives and mothers in the mobilization against Allende.6 By
linking women's most prominent roles in society with the fight for democracy
conservatives were able to bring about the downfall of Allende. The conservative party
adopted the issues which were most important to women at the time; scarcity of food and
defense of the country and advocated on the behalf of women. These were the issues that

6

Power, Margaret (1953) Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56.
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struck at what it meant to be a woman in Chile at the time; a provider and a mother.
Women were instrumental in the conservative led oppositional march coined the "March
of Empty Pots and Pans." Women came to the streets in opposition to Allende and the
scarcity of food he was creating for Chilean families.
Conservatism continued to infiltrate Chilean society will into the 20th century as
conservative values have long been emphasized and practiced in Chilean society.
Conservative political elites prevented divorce from being legalized in Chile until 2004
and abortion has yet to be legalized. The widespread Catholic presence in Chile delayed
the legalization of divorce until 2004. Homosexuality and euthanasia are also not
recognized as acceptable or lawful practices in Chilean society.
Chilean women continued to be strong supporters of social conservatism well into
the 21st century. Inglehart and Norris found utilizing survey data from the World Values
Survey in 2002 that conservative values and a conservative ideology were widespread
among Chilean women. Conservative values in Chile have historically been linked to an
emphasis on familial ties, marriage, a high level of religiosity, and a belief that women
should stay at home and have limited rights compared to men 7
The Chilean case raises several interesting questions which will form the basis of
this study. Seligson found that starting in 2006 Chilean citizens were starting to selfidentify to the left of the ideological spectrum. If Chileans, and more importantly Chilean
women, identify to the left ideologically then it suggests social and ideological change is
occurring in Chile. If this ideological change among women has indeed occurred, than
support for conservative values may be replaced by support for liberal and democratic
values as Seligson suggests. In the future, the practices of abortion, euthanasia, and
7

Oppenheim, Lois (1999) Politics in Chile. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 266-267.
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homosexuality may eventually be legalized and women may assume a greater role in the
realm of politics and formal employment.
Overwhelming support for Bachelet in the 2006 presidential elections in Chile
may provide further evidence of changes in ideology and values. It has been shown by
Seligson that a leftist ideology in Chile is associated with support for democracy and
support for civil liberties and rights. If Chileans and women have indeed shifted to the
left, this is demonstrative of widespread support for democracy and the liberal values,
associated with this form of government. This research may lead the Chilean government
to take its role as a reformer and a provider of basic services more seriously Perhaps, by
doing so, the ideological orientation of Chileans will further be affected translating into a
favorable rating for democracy and democratic institutions
This study asks two important questions which will form the basis for my
research; are Chilean women joining the trend to the left, and if so why? As traditionally
staunch conservatives, Chilean women's ideological orientation may not be so quick to
change as in other Latin American countries such as Venezuela and Bolivia, where
women have jumped on board the liberal bandwagon. If an ideological change has
occurred among Chilean women - what demographics and attitudinal issues can account
for it?
This research contributes to the understanding of ideology in Latin America and
the causal mechanisms of women's ideological orientation. Other studies have
investigated gender difference in partisanship, vote choice, and even ideology in the
United States and Latin America. However, this research examines the demographic
factors and attitudinal issues that determine the ideological orientation of Chilean women.

5

The foundation for this research is a similar study conducted by Norrander and Wilcox
in the U.S. Norrander and Wilcox examined the demographic and attitudinal issues
which accounted for the shift to the left among a segment of women. Recently, an
ideological change in self-identification has occurred in Latin America, this research will
discuss the extent of which this trend has affected Chilean women and the correlation
between ideological orientation, demographics, and women's attitudes toward social
issues and government intervention.
This thesis relies upon statistical analysis to interpret 2006 LAPOP survey data.
The Latin America Public Opinion Project is an independent survey of the citizens of
Latin America and their political values conducted by Vanderbilt University under the
general guidance of director Mitchell Seligson.8 This survey was conducted as part of the
LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2006.9 The 2006 survey of Chileans was designed by
Vanderbilt University in conjunction with the Institute de Ciencias Politicas of the
Pontifica Universidad Catolica de Chile.10 The study consists of 1,517 completed
surveys, 835 of which were completed by men, and 682 by women.11 A national
probability design was used and the margin of error for the sample was +-2.57.n

8

The Latin America Public Opinion Project (www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop). THE 2006 LATIN AMERICA
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY [dataset]. Nashville, TN: Vandeibilt University [producer and distributor].
9
LAPOP2006
10
LAPOP2006
11
LAPOP 2006
12
LAPOP2006
13
LAPOP2006
14
LAPOP2006
15
Seligson, Mitchell (2007) "The Rise of Populism and the Left in Latin America," The Democracy
Barometers, vol. 18 no. 4: 87-95.
16
Seligson 2007
17
Seligson 2007
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Respondents were drawn from the voting age population, and a quota system based on
sex and age was established to select respondents.13 Funding for this study was supplied
by the Instituto de Ciencias Politicas of the Pontifica Universidad Catolica de Chile.14
Survey data are useful for understanding social demographics, women's attitudes
toward government intervention programs, and women's attitudes toward social issues.
These data enhance the external validity of the research. Survey design is useful in this
study for making predictions about women's attitudes toward government intervention
and social issues. Even though survey design is not without limitations, it is the most
appropriate research design to be used in this study. This research will add to the existing
literature of ideology and gender by looking at the influence women's attitudes toward
social issues and government intervention have on the ideological orientation of Chilean
women,
Is there a Gender Gap in Chile?
Ideological orientation has recently become the focal point of several studies of
Latin American political behavior. Seligson examined the ideological orientation of
Latin American citizens and the relationship of ideology to support for democracy and
democratic institutions. Seligson argued that for an ideological shift to matter it must
translate into voting behavior and party preferences.15 Seligson analyzed survey data
from the World Values Survey and the AmericasBarometer questionnaire asking
respondents to self-position themselves on an ideological scale from 1 (extremely

18

Power, Margaret (1953) Eight-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle Against Allende.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 56.
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conservative) to 10 (extremely liberal). He concluded that in many socially conservative
countries, including Chile, citizens had shifted to the left ideologically but the magnitude
of the shift is small.17 This regional shift to the left has put a spotlight on Chile a country
known for its longstanding social conservatism.
Chilean women have historically been linked to conservative issues and parties
Chilean women's historic identification with the conservative party is evidence of
women's conservatism in Chile.
Although Chilean women were not granted the right to vote until 1935, in 1917
the Conservative Party in Chile called for a law to be passed extending the right to vote to
Chilean women.18 This "sponsorship" of a voting law in Chile by the Right is but one
example where conservative parties have advocated on the behalf of women in order to
increase the "support for the Conservative party" while simultaneously "expanding the
support" for traditional gender roles 19
Another piece of evidence for women's conservatism in Chile is Chilean
women's prominent role in the overthrow of Allende. During the turbulent years of the
Salvador Allende government, conservative women were instrumental in the eventual

I9

Power 1953
Powerl953
21
Oppenheim, Lois (1999) Politics in Chile. Boulder,CO: Westview Press: 64-65.
22
Oppenheim 1999
23
Oppenheim 1999
24
Oppenheim 1999
25
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^Power^S
27
Power 1953
28
Power 1953
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overthrow of the Unidad Popular.20 Ideological orientation has long been contentious in
Chile, as ideological polarization ushered in the demise of democracy under Allende in
1973 and gave rise to the 17 year Pinochet dictatorship. Women featured prominently in
these ideological battles, as women's protests for and against democracy were important
in overthrowing Allende's Popular Unity government.
The most famous march led by right-wing women against the government of
Allende was appropriately called the March of the Empty Pots and Pans. Well to do
women took to the streets of Chile on December 1, 1971 ushering in the beginning of a
"mass opposition movement."21 These women were opposed to Allende's economic
policy which was creating a scarcity of food by raising worker's salaries.22 Interestingly
enough, this large scale women's protest, constituted the first "mass mobilization"
against the Unidad Populare.23 Conservative women fed up with the burdensome
economic crisis took charge in "catalyzing" political opposition to Allende.24
Scholars attribute the demise and "forcible dismantalization" of Allende to the
work of oppositional women's groups.

25

The issues weighing heavily on women's

support for conservatism during the 1970s were an inability to provide basic resources for
their children due to a scarcity of food and public disorder/violence.26 Most fascinating in
regards to the large scale women's opposition movement was the ability of conservative
leaders in the Christian Democratic Party and the National Party to "appeal" to women as

30
31

Power 1953
Power 1953
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both wives and mothers in the mobilization against Allende. By linking women's most
prominent roles in society with the fight for the overthrow of democracy, conservatives
were able to bring about the downfall of Allende. Women became drawn to the principles
and philosophy behind the Conservative Party.28 The doctrine of the Church, which
women looked to for spiritual guidance, was embodied in the message of conservatism.
Furthermore, the parties of the Right promised to pursue policies that would benefit
women and their families. Conservative leaders played upon the "rage and frustration"
many women felt as a result of the food shortages and lack of security to mobilize women
against Allende. 30 Women believed that stability and security could only be achieved
when there was a complete military overthrow of Allende.31
Stern illuminates the reasons women identified with conservatism in a series of
qualitative interviews with Chilean women conducted after the military dictator Pinochet
came to power. After the demise of Allende, women became prominent supporters of
Pinochet and his conservative party which successfully overthrew Allende. Even after
Pinochet was accused of crimes and human rights abuses committed during his seventeen
year rule, conservative women continued to support the Chilean military dictator.32 Some
women even denied that human rights abuses had occurred. Stem poignantly captures the
perspective of Chilean women who supported the takeover of Chile by the military

3Z

Powerl953
Stem, Steve (2004) Remembering Pinochet's Chile. Durham and London: Duke University Press: 6.
34
Stem2004
35
Stern2004
36
Stern 2004
33
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backed Pinochet. Many people including Dona Elena saw Pinochet as a "hero." For her
and many like Elana the overthrow of Allende saved her family and "set Chile on the
road to good health." 34In the mind of Dona Elena the cost of Pinochet was less than the
cost to Chilean society if Allende had remained in power.35 Dona Elena remembered the
transition of power from President Frei to Allende as one of upheaval and violence.
Property was seized and the government took over industries. For Dona Elena, President
Allende was "too frivolous and irresponsible to control those on the Left who did
advocate and organize violence."36 For many, Allende for many represented the turmoil
and violence to conservative Chilean society. Stem notes that "the world of conservative
middle-class and Catholic morality, as well as conservative arrangements of property fell
apart in the 1960s and 1970s," and for women like Dona Elena this happened because of
Allende and his socialist ideals. 37
Even well into the 20th century, perhaps one of the most surprising consequences
of democratization and modernization of Chilean society was the maintenance of
"traditional, conservative, classist, and sexist" values.38 Even as Chile experienced record
economic growth, the underlying conservative values were still present.39 Efforts to
37

Stern2004
Oppenheim, Lois (1999) Politics in Chile. Boulder, CO: Westview Press: 266-267.
39
Oppenheim 1999
40
Oppenheim 1999
41
Powef, Margaret (1953) Right-Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 261-263.
42
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legalize divorce and liberalize abortion laws were met with great resistance from the
legislature and the right-wing dominated media.40 Machismo was also still "pervasive,"
and gender barriers prevented many women from leaving their homes.41
On January 16, 2000 Richard Lagos was elected president of Chile after securing
a majority of votes from Chilean men.42 Chilean women voted for the candidate to the
Right of the ideological spectrum, Joaquin Lavin for the same reasons that they supported
the overthrow of Allende. Just as in the 1970s, the Right continued to appeal to women
because Lavin "spoke directly to their primary concerns and promised that he would
solve their most urgent problems."43 The issues which motivated women in their
identification as conservatives were once again related to the family, security, and their
roles as wives and mothers.44 Lavin promised to create new jobs, improve schools, help
the elderly, and crack down on the high crime rate which instilled fear in many Chilean
women.45 Women were drawn to his rhetoric of making it easier for women to work and
have a family. Just as in 1970, the Right did a better job than the Left in creating a
program centered around women and the issues important to them.46 The Left, just as

^PowerlPSS
47
Power 1953
48
The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI2. The exact wording of the political ideology question is,
"Otra forma de situarse politicamente es utilizando los conceptos de conservador o liberal. En una escala de
1 a 10, donde 1 significa que usted es totalmente "conservador" y 10 que usted es totalmente "liberal, i en
que" lugar situaria usted?" On the ideological scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 10 is extremely
liberal where do you position yourself?. The exact wording of the gender question is "Genero: (l)hombre
(2)mujer." Gender: (1) male (2) female. The variable in this study was recoded (0) male and (1) female
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under Allende, "failed to" create a program that "dealt with the realities and aspirations
of Chilean women. 47
How do Chilean women orient themselves ideologically today? Despite the long
standing historical relationship between Chilean women and conservatism, Chileans are
starting to self-identify to the left ideologically. Seligson finds that despite the magnitude
of the ideological shift to the left being small it is nonetheless present among Chilean
voters. Now we must determine if Chilean women are joining this trend or if they are
continuing to follow the historical pull of social conservatism. In this research the
ideological orientation of respondents refers to the degree to which Chileans self-position
themselves on an ideological scale. Ideological orientation is operationalized by a 2006
LAPOP survey question asking respondents to self-position themselves on an ideological
scale rangingfrom(1) extremely conservative to (10) extremely liberal.48Gender refers to
the sex of the respondent. Gender is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question
recording respondent's gender.
Figure 1 indicates that 22% of Chilean men self- position themselves as a 5 or
somewhere in between an extremely liberal and extremely conservative ideological
orientation. Likewise, 21.4% of Chilean women self-positioned themselves on the
ideological scale at greater than 5, or liberal.

49

An Independent Samples t Test determined the significance of this result, indicating that there is a
statistically significant difference between the mean ideological position of men and the mean ideological
position ofwomen at the .001 level.
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Figure 1: The Frequency of Chileans Self-Placement on the Ideological Scale
Gender
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Figure 2 indicates that overall, out of 791 male respondents, the average
ideological position is 5.94. Out of 660 female respondents, the average ideological
position is 5.21. There is a small but statistically significant difference between the two.49
While women historically have been more conservative than men, by 2006 the
differences between men and women were slight. Indeed, on average women were
staunchly in the center of the ideological spectrum.

14

Figure 2

The Average Ideological Orientation of Chileans by Sex
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To understand the reasons for the ideological orientation of Chilean women, this
paper is organized into six subsequent chapters. I begin chapter two by establishing a
theoreticalframeworkexplaining the ideological shift to the left among Chilean women.
The first part of this framework explores studies that address the impact demographic
factors have on the ideological orientations of men and women. The second part explores
studies that address the impact attitudinal variables have had and continue to have on the
ideological orientations of men and women.

15

Chapter three will focus on demographic variables and their relation to the
ideological orientation of Chilean women. Chapter four will examine women's attitudes
toward the social policies of divorce, euthanasia, abortion, and homosexuality and their
relationship to women's ideological preferences. Chapter five will focus on women's
attitudes toward government issues and their relationship toward women's ideology.
Using multivariate regression analysis, chapter six will analyze survey/attitudinal data in
Chile related to social issues, social demographics, and government intervention. This
analysis will show how changes in women's attitudes toward social policy and
government intervention, has led to a slight ideological shift to the left among Chilean
women. Chapter seven will explore the results of this analysis and offer a conclusion.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
What factors account for Chilean women's liberal ideological orientation?
According to Powers, the scarcity of food and personal security were the two pressing
issues which factored into women's support for a conservative opposition movement
against Allende.50 The literature review that follows uses the literature conducted on
women's ideological orientation in the US to identify additional factors that may explain
Chilean women's ideological orientation, particularly potential structural and attitudinal
variables.
This research relies on several theoretical approaches to explain the ideological
orientation of Chilean women A structural/ demographic approach examines the effect
variables related to the structural characteristics of a population have on the ideological
orientation of citizens. Commonly used demographic variables in social science research
are age, race, educational attainment, and income level. An attitudinal approach in this
research examines the effect a population or group's values, beliefs, and opinions of
certain subjects have on the ideological preferences of citizens.
Structural Approach
The structuralism approach seeks to establish relationships between demographic
variables and ideological orientation. Brooks and Manza explored differences between
men and women in the US through a quantitative study of different structural theories.
They use structural theories to explain gender differences in the voting behavior of both
50

Power, Margaret (1953) Right- Wing Women in Chile: Feminine Power and the Struggle against Allende.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press: 261-263.
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men and women in U.S. presidential elections. Even though their dependent variable is
distinct, their analysis still illuminates the potential importance of structural factors in
explaining ideology. Their study relied upon data collected from the National Election
Survey, which produces data on voting, public opinion, and political participation in the
United States during the presidential election years of 1952 to 1992.51
The structural/demographic approach they utilized points to four key factors
important in understanding the gender gap in voting. The first was an increase in
women's autonomy. The logic behind this theory was that married women have a
different voting behavior than divorced or single women who possess more autonomy
and independence than their married counterparts.52 In support of this theory, Carroll
found evidence for the argument that the gender gap in the 1980 election can be
attributed to the increasing number of unmarried women who remain independent from a
husband. 53This research has important implications for this study because the growing
autonomy of women in Chile and the availability of divorce as ah option for women to
gain independence from their husbands may be prominent factors in the liberal
orientation of Chilean women.
The second factor in this study was socialization. The logic behind this factor was
that differences in the patterns of socialization for both men and women caused them to
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hold different political beliefs, core values, and behavior.54 Some theorists such as
Gilligan argued that childhood socialization was most important in determining the
political values of men and women as adults.55 In contrast, others, such as Sapiro argue
that women's connection to their role as mothers has important implications in their
political preferences and vote choice.56 Women may view the Democratic Party more
favorably because of the value the party places on providing for the general welfare of
families. Their research has important implications for this study because it discusses
how the values and beliefs of either political elites or parties can strongly influence voter
choice. The same applies to the case of Chilean women throughout history whose
ideological preferences were shaped by conservative elites who appealed to women's
roles as mothers.
The third factor in this research was a rise in feminist consciousness. Brooks and
Manza believed that women who were more likely to identify themselves with the
women's movement were thus more likely to vote Democratic.57 In agreement Conover
found in a 1988 study that gender differences in voter choice among men and women is
due to rising feminist identities among women.58 Likewise, Cook in her article finds that
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feminists have traditionally been more supportive of Democratic candidates in the 1972,
1984, and 1988 elections

59

The fourth factor looked at an increase in women's employment. This theory
predicted that women who were employed in the labor force would be more likely to vote
Democratic.60 However, the "political significance" of women's participation in the work
force remains controversial.61 Andersen and Cook argued that women's employment did
not influence political values.62 Likewise, Plutzer and Deitch found that other
sociodemographic variables had a much greater effect on the gender gap.63
Brooks and Manza concluded that the gender gap in voting behavior was best
explained by the increase in the number of women who were employed.64 The increase in
the number of women employed resulted in a shift among women toward support for
Democratic presidential candidates. There was little to no statistical evidence indicating a
relationship between women's autonomy and socialization processes with the emerging
gender gap.65 Likewise, the theory suggesting that women were more likely to vote
Democratic as result of the support for the women's movement was not found to be
60
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significant. This research implies that the demographic variable of women's employment
is a prominent reason for the gender gap in voting choice. Brooks and Manza were unable
to rule out attitudinal changes in regards to women's participation in the labor force as
being responsible for the emerging gender gap in vote choice. Brooks and Manza's
finding are important to this research because it starts the examination of potential
demographic factors that influence a gender gap, while also recognizing that attitudinal
variables may be significant factors. This research, however, fails to provide knowledge
regarding the demographic variables which predict the ideological preferences of
women.
Structural/Demographic and Attitudinal Approach
Like Brooks and Manza, Inglehart and Norris also focused on the importance of
demographic/ structural variables in their study. However, Inglehart and Norris expanded
upon previous gender gap studies in vote choice, issues, and partisanship in their 2002
study by examining the gender gap in ideology, and public opinion in various world
regions.66
Inglehart and Norris argued that women who were once more likely to selfidentify as conservative in post-industrial societies were now more likely to identify as
liberal.67The theory utilized to explain this phenomenon was accurately coined gender
realignment. Norris and Inglehart argued that in post-industrial societies a modern gender
gap where women held more left leaning values than men had replaced the traditional
gender gap. The cause of this gender realignment in the United States was thought to be
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an interaction between a shift in cultural values and new structural developments (the
employment of women, educational advancement of women, and decrease in religiosity)
that have "reshaped" political values.68
Essentially, what these social scientists argued was that changes in the lives of
women in post-industrial societies had led to changes in ideological preferences. This
research has important implications for this study because it discusses how a combination
of structural and cultural changes may lead to changes in the ideological preferences of
women.
Utilizing data from the World Values Survey during 1995-2002 Inglehart and
Norris concluded that women hold more left-leaning values than men in regards to the
appropriate role of the state versus the market, and government role in social protection
and public ownership.69 Women were more likely than men to hold left leaning values in
the areas of support for an active role of government in social protection and public
ownership of business, and in support for political issues.70 They found that women were
more liberal than men due to a more influential set of attitudinal variables. While
Inglehart and Norris recognized that a rise in feminist consciousness, an increase in
women's autonomy, and women's increasing participation in the labor force were
69
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important factors in explaining the gender gap, it was the shift in cultural values that
featured more prominently in women's changing ideological orientation. Inglehart and
Norris' findings are important to this research because it highlights how influential
women's attitudes toward the economy specifically in terms of government intervention
are in determining the ideological preferences of women. Attitudinal factors are not only
important determinants of the ideological orientation of women but also in explaining
why women are more liberal than men.
Recently, and most applicable to this research, is a 2007 U.S. study conducted by
Norrander and Wilcox which examined the presence of a gender gap in ideological selfidentification in the U.S. In this research, Norrander and Wilcox examined the effect
specific demographic variables and attitudinal variables had on the ideological gender
gap. While existing studies such as the studies by Inglehart and Norris, and Brooks and
Manza, account for the gender gap in partisanship, vote choice, and issues, "far less
attention" has been paid to the impact social issues and attitudinal values have on gender
differences in ideology.71 A few scholars have confirmed the existence of an ideological
gender gap but little exists in the way of an actual explanation for its existence.
Likewise, whereas Inglehart and Norris have noted the increasing liberal
identification of American women as accounting for gender difference between men and
women, few studies have tried to explain what accounts for this gender gap. Norrander
and Wilcox, argue that ideological identification helps "organize" people's political

72

Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," Journal ofPolitical
Behavior, Springer
73
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
74
Norrander and Wilcox 2007

23

worlds. For some, an ideological identity is the foundation from which people formulate
their values and make political judgments.73 And for others, an ideological orientation
shapes their voting choice and political beliefs.74 The election of Chilean president
Bachelet may be indicative of changing ideological preferences resulting in changes in
partisan preferences Those studies that have examined ideological identification have
suggested that women's conservative leaning in the past was due to their greater religious
adherence.75 Now, as women become more secular they have also become more liberal.
This may be the case in Chile where examples of secularization such as the legalization
of a divorce law are indicative of a weakening influence of the Catholic Church on the
ideological orientation of Chilean women.
Norrander and Wilcox conceptualize ideological identity as an identity that both
causes and is a consequence of specific issue positions. These social scientists make three
concrete arguments while also acknowledging that the gender gap has reversed from the
1950s when men were more liberal than women. They argue that the liberal leanings of
American women, and the conservative stance of American men, arise from differences
in issue positions and policy preferences between men and women.76 Specifically,
Kauffman and Petrocik attribute the growing gender gap in ideological preferences to
attitudes toward the role of government in the creation of social policy. This may be but
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one set of attitudinal variables that have been influential in the slight shift to the centre
left of Chilean women.
Second, Norrander and Wilcox argue that the gender gap in ideological selfidentification is due to differences between men and women in the issues that shaped
their ideological identities.77 Instead of different views on the same issue accounting for
the ideological gender gap, Norrander and Wilcox hypothesized that a different set of
issues for men and women may be more important in determining what ideological
identity they acquire. Previous studies by Gilens and Kaufmann have suggested that men
and women differ in what issues they consider to be important and this strongly
determines their partisan preferences.78 Kauffman argued that for women gender-specific
issues such as reproduction rights, gender equality, and equal rights were central to the
partisanship choices of women, whereas for men social welfare issues were more
important.79 This argument has implications for this study because a certain set of social
or economic issues may account for women's slight shift to the centre-left.
Third, Norrander and Wilcox hypothesized that a gender gap in ideological selfidentification may be caused by a group of men changing their ideological selfidentification while a similar group of women have not or vice versa.80 The gender gap
in ideological orientation among Chilean women may then be the result of a combination
of demographic and attitudinal variables that have caused women to shift more centre-left
79
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than men. These arguments are applicable to the study of the ideological orientation of
women in Chile because they stress the importance of attitudinal variables as important
factors in the ideological preferences of women.
The data utilized in Norrander and Wilcox study was from the American
National Election Study's ideological self-placement scale beginning with the 1972
survey through 2006.81 The seven point ideological scale utilized in this study ranged
from 1-7. The variable was coded 1 for an extreme liberal identification and 10 for an
extreme conservative identification. First, Norrander and Wilcox looked at historical
trends in gender differences in ideological orientation. They accomplished this by noting
the average placement of men and women who identify themselves as liberals,
moderates, and conservatives.82 On average, both men and women had a mean
ideological position above 4.0 indicating a slight conservative leaning. Similar to the
measurement utilized by Inglehart and Norris, the gender gap was measured by
subtracting women's mean ideological position from men's mean ideological position. A
positive gap score indicated that women were more likely than men to self-identify as
liberal. Between 1992 and 2004, the gender gap averaged .24 and was significant.83 It is
interesting to note that the gender gap did not emerge because women as a whole have
become more liberal.84
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After determining the means, they then analyzed the percentages of men and
women who identified in each of the three ideological categories. In contrast to the study
conducted by Inglehart and Norris, Norrander and Wilcox found that both men and
women have become more conservative over time, but that a group of women defined be
being college educated and unmarried have become more liberal. The surveys indicated
that men on average have become much more conservative than women thereby
accounting for the gender gap.85 An analysis of the percentages of men and women who
identify as liberals, conservatives, and moderates showed a somewhat conflicting trend
This analysis suggested that both men and women identified themselves as conservatives,
but that women at the beginning of the time series were 8 percentage points less likely
than men to self-identify as conservative.86 Likewise, over time women were more likely
to identify themselves as liberal while men were not. Taking the conflicting results into
account, Norrander and Wilcox concluded that an examination of the average mean
ideological position of men and women "masked" the "dual trajectory of women."

87

Analyzing the percentages showed that a segment of women were more likely to identify
themselves as liberal even as both men and women increasingly adopted conservative
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ideological self-placements. Thus, while men were increasingly becoming more
conservative, women as a group were experiencing an "ideological divide."88
Explanations for gender differences in individual self-placements on the ideological scale
were then measured examining a multitude of demographic and issue attitudinal
variables, which are important to this study. " Norrander and Wilcox focused on the
impact of "economic locations" such as income and union membership. They also looked
at new "cultural cleavages" such as education, marital status, religiosity, and evangelical
denominations on ideological self-identification while holding constant demographic
variables such as race, age, and region. 90 To examine which groups of Americans were
changing their ideology, they tested the relationship between demographic variables and
the seven point ideological scale.91 They found that employment and union membership
had different effects for men versus women. Men who were employed were more likely
to have conservative leanings while women who were employed were more likely to
have liberal leanings.92 Men who were members of a union were more likely to identify
themselves as liberal.93 Income had become a less significant predictor of men's ideology
and was not significant for women. Race was not a significant predictor of ideology for
either men or women but religiosity (measured by asking respondents how frequently
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they attended church) was a significant predictor of a conservative identity for both
94

sexes.
Interestingly, some variables were found to be more important over time for
either men or for women in predicting their ideological self-placement For women
education increasingly became a significant predictor of ideology.95 Norrander and
Wilcox found that college educated women were more likely to self-identify as liberal.
Likewise, they concluded that as a result of the increase in the number of college
educated women, women as a group had become slightly more liberal over
time.96Married women and married men were more likely to be conservative than
unmarried women and unmarried men.97 These results indicated that marriage was a
significant factor in explaining women's ideological position. For men, income and
employment had decreased in significance over time and were no longer linked to men's
ideological self-placement.98 However, an increase in the number of women who held
college degrees, and an increase in the number of unmarried women, resulted in both
groups being more likely than other women to self-identify as liberal.99 Thus, Norrander
and Wilcox concluded that college educated and unmarried women were the segments of
women responsible for producing gender differences between men and women in
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ideological self-identification.

Changes in the level of education and in the marital

status of women had led to changes in women's self-identification.

101

After determining which groups of men and women were responsible for the
gender gap in ideological self-identification, Norrander and Wilcox then explored the
potential reasons for changes in women's ideological self-identification. The focus of
their study was on the political issues related to ideological orientation that may differ for
men and for women. In their study, Norrander and Wilcox made reference to past
research that has suggested social welfare issues are paramount for men in determining
their vote choice and partisanship, while cultural issues such as support for feminism,
religion, abortion rights, and gay and lesbian rights are more important determinants for
women.102 To test the relationship between ideological self-identification and these
issues, Norrander and Wilcox utilized ANES surveys beginning in 1980. The five issues
that they chose to analyze were social welfare (government guarantee of jobs), civil rights
(aid to Blacks), the role of women in society, moral issues (abortion) and defense issues.
To examine the relationship between religion and ideological self-identification they
included a measure of evangelical religious doctrine.
Not surprisingly, given the "salience" of the issue, Norrander and Wilcox found
that women's and men's attitudes on abortion were significant predictors of ideological
self-identification.103 Women and men who were pro-choice were more likely to identify
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themselves as liberal whereas women and men who were pro-life were more likely to
identify themselves as conservative104 Similarly, women's role in society was also a
significant predictor of both men's and women's ideology. Past research indicating that
women and men who followed traditional gender roles were more likely to be
conservative supported these findings. 105 Norrander and Wilcox also found that over
time attitudes on social welfare issues such as government provision of jobs was
becoming a less significant predictor of ideological orientation overtime for both men and
women.106 However, it was still an influential factor in predicting men's ideological selfidentification. Following Evangelical religious doctrine was a significant predictor of
both men's and women's ideological self-identification. Men and women who followed
religious doctrine were more likely to be conservative.
Norrander and Wilcox concluded that a gender gap between men and women was
the result of a growing segment of women self-identifying as liberal even as both men
and women were increasingly becoming more conservative.107 Men's increasing
conservatism over time was the result of the decreasing significance of income on
ideological self-identification.108 Over time both poor and wealthy men self-identified as
conservative/Between income brackets there was no significant difference in ideological

107

Norrander and Wilcox 2007
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
109
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
110
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
111
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
112
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
108

31

self-identification.

Norrander and Wilcox also determined that in the case of women,

an increase in the number of college educated women and an increase in the number of
women who were single had resulted in an increase in the number of women who selfidentified as liberal.110 Even though higher education levels and a single status had
always predicted a more liberal self-identification among women, changes in both
demographics had resulted in a larger number of liberal women.111
Norrander and Wilcox also concluded that religion remains a very important
predictor of ideological identification, while attitudes toward abortion and women's role
in society became significant predictors of ideological self-identification for both men
and women overtime.112 Therefore, attitudes on political issues were significantly related
to both women's and men's ideological self-identification. This research has important
implications for this study because it explores attitudinal and demographic factors that are
significant predictors of the ideological orientation of women This research provides a
basisfromwhich to determine whether Chilean women have followed a similar trajectory
to women in the United States. A liberal orientation among Chilean women may be the
result of similar demographic and attitudinal factors found to be significant in their study.
This research will begin by examining the influence of demographic factors and
attitudinal factors on the liberal orientation of Chilean women. This research will argue
that a combination of demographic and attitudinal factors have influenced the ideological
orientation of Chilean women.
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CHAPTER m

THE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHICS ON WOMEN'S IDEOLOGICAL
ORIENTATION
This chapter explores the relationship between the demographic variables of age,
education, marital status, income, and religiosity and women's ideological orientation.
When testing the significance of the relationship between the independent variables and
the dependent variable, only women were selected for the analysis. In this research the
ideological orientation of women refers to the degree to which Chilean women selfposition themselves on an ideological scale Ideological orientation is operationalized by
a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents to self-position themselves on an
ideological scale rangingfrom(1) extremely conservative to (10) extremely liberal
Age

Norrander and Wilcox suggested in their study that older women in the United
States were more likely than younger women to identify as conservative.113 Inglehart and
Norris attributed the gender realignment among women in the U.S. to the process of
modernization and its effect on value and lifestyle change.114 Specific to Chile, Seligson
found that older Chileans are actually less likely to identify with leftist regimes than in
other Latin American countries.115 Leftist regimes in Chile are associated with liberal
1 3
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values, so it is not surprising that older traditional Chileans are more supportive of
conservative regimes and conservative values. In Chile, older women who had protested
under Allende, might be more conservative than those who had not grown up under the
tumultuous Allende years.
In this study age refers to the age in years of women. Age is operationalized by a
2006 LAPOP survey question asking women what their age in years is. u 6 I hypothesize
that as the age of women increases, ideology will become more conservative. The null
hypothesis in this study is that there is no relationship between the age of Chilean women
and their ideological orientation.
Overall, the average age of women respondents in the LAPOP survey was 44
years of age. To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the age of
women and their ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation
test between women's age and ideological orientation. Figure 3 suggests that at the
bivariate level there is a relationship between women's age and ideological orientation
and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as
the age of women increases, they become less liberal
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Figure 3: The Effect of Age on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women
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Age in years

A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates the relationship between age and
the ideological orientation of Chilean women. The Pearson's correlation coefficient (r= .218) indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship at the .001 level between
the age of Chilean women and their ideological orientation. As the age of Chilean women
increases, they become less liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. In
support of Seligson's finding, this analysis finds that younger women in Chile are more
likely to self-identify as liberal and espouse civil liberties and liberal values. Older
women in Chile are more likely to espouse conservative traditional values.
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Marital Status
The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States
married women were more likely than non-married women to self-identify as
conservative.117 Inglehart and Norris also found that married women were more likely to
self-identify as conservative.118 Married women have different interests and lifestyles
than their non-married counterparts, and these differences are reflected in selfperception.119 In this study marital status of women refers to the civil status of women.
Marital status is operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents
whether they are single, married, widowed, divorced, civil union, or separated.120 Marital
status is coded (1) single, (2) married, (3) civil union, (4) divorced, (5) separated, and (6)
widowed.121
The second hypothesis in this study predicts that there is a statistically significant
difference in the mean ideological orientation between married women and women who
are single or in a partnership. Married women will be less likely than single women to be
liberal. Overall, in the LAPOP survey the majority or 55% of Chilean women
respondents were married and 45% were not.121 To test the null hypothesis that there is
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no statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation between married
women and single women, an Independent Samples t Test will be conducted. Figure 4
suggests there is a relationship between women's marital status and ideological
orientation, married women are significantly less likely than single women to be liberal.

Figure 4: The Effect of Marital Status on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean
Women
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Thos women who are married had ideological scores closer to the conservative
end of the spectrum. The difference between the mean ideological position for married
women and the mean ideological position for single women is .73. An Independent
Samples t Test will determine the significance of this result. The Independent Samples t
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Test shows that there is a significant difference between the ideological position of single
women and the ideological position of married women at the .001 level. The significance
statistic of .000 is much less than .001. Therefore, there is a statistically significant
difference between the mean ideological position of single women and married women
and the null hypothesis can therefore be rejected. Single women are significantly more
likely than married women to be liberal.
Religion
The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States
religious women and men were more likely than non-religious women and men to
identify as conservative.122 Inglehart and Norris also found that religious belief was
associated with traditional values and identification with a conservative ideology123
Historically in Chile the Catholic religion has permeated all aspects of life in Chile. The
strong opposition to the legalization of divorce by the Catholic Church has featured
prominently in delaying reform of existing social laws in Chilean society. In this research
religion refers to the religious denomination of respondents. Religion is operationalized
by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking women what their religious denomination is.
Respondents are given the choice of selecting (1) Catholic^ (2) Christian, (3) Other than
Christian, (5) Evangelical, (6) Jewish, and (4) nothing.124
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The third hypothesis in this study predicts that there will be a statistically
significant difference in the mean ideological orientation of women who adhere to a
religious denomination and those who do not. Women who belong to a religion will be
less liberal than women who do not. Overall, the majority of Chilean women respondents
in the LAPOP survey, or 70% are Catholic.125 To test the null hypothesis that there is no
statistically significant difference in the mean ideological orientation of women who
belong to a religious denomination and those who do not, this research will utilize an
Independent Samples t Test between religion and women's ideological orientation.
Figure 5 suggests there is a relationship between women's religious denomination and
ideological orientation and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the
research hypothesis, women who identify with a religious denomination will'be Jess,
liberal.
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Figure 5: The Effect of Religion on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women
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Women not belonging to a religion had ideological scores closer to the liberal end
of the spectrum. The difference between the mean ideological position for women who
belong in a religious denomination and the mean ideological position for women who do
not is .86. The Independent Samples t Test shows that there is a significant difference
between the ideological position of women who belong to a religious denomination and
the ideological position of women who do not (p< .05). Therefore, there is a statistically
significant difference between the mean ideological position of women who do and do
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not belong to a religious denomination and the null hypothesis can therefore be rejected.
Women who do not belong to a religious denomination are significantly more likely than
women who do belong to a religious denomination to be liberal. In support of Norrander
and Wilcox finding, this analysis finds that Catholic women and Evangelical women are
more likely to self-identify as conservative, while women who do not belong to a
religious denomination are more likely to be liberal
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Income
The research by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that in the United States income
was not a significant predictor of women's ideological orientation over time.

In

contrast, Inglehart and Norris found that while past research pointed to socioeconomic
status being an insignificant predictor of gender differences in voting between men and
women, middle class women were more likely than other income groups to self-identify
•

128

as conservative.
In this research income refers to the range of income a family makes. Income is
operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents their family

126
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Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the
World. Cambridge University Press: 91.
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The LAPOP name for this variable is QlO.The exact wording of the income range question is "^En cual
de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiars mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las
remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?"
130
LAPOP dataset Chile 2006.
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income range.

Income is coded (1) less than 40.000 pesos to (10) more than 980.000

pesos. 13° For comparison there are 13 pesos for every U.S. dollar
The fourth hypothesis in this study predicts that as the income level of women
increases they will be less liberal. Overall, the majority of Chilean women respondents in
the LAPOP survey, or 26% fall into a lower middle income bracket of 109 to 190 pesos.
To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the income level of
women and their ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation
test between income level and ideological orientation.
The Pearson's r coefficient of .045 was not significant, indicating that there is not
a significant relationship between income level and women's ideological orientation.
Figure 6 further confirmed this trend. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected.
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Figure 6: The Effect of Income on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean Women
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Interviewer response effects such as social desirability may be why no significant
correlation was found between income level and the ideological orientation of Chilean
women. The lack of a relationship may also be due to other factors being more influential
than income in explaining Chilean women's liberal orientation. Income may not factor in
to women's decision to become ideologically liberal.
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Educational Attainment
The research conducted by Norrander and Wilcox suggested that education level
was a significant predictor of the ideological orientation of women in the U.S.131 Women
with a college education were more likely than less educated women and men to selfidentify as liberal. 132Inglehart and Norris also found that the entry of women into higher
education had a significant effect on their political values and priorities.133 Numerous
public opinion studies have indicated education is "consistently linked" with more liberal
attitudes.134 In this research the level of educational attainment of women refers to the
highest level of education obtained by women. Level of educational attainment is
operationalized by a 2006 LAPOP survey question asking respondents what their highest
level of educational attainment is by grade. Respondent's Education level is arranged as
an ordinal scale by primary school (grades 1-8), secondary school (grades 9-12),
university level (grades 13-17), higher non- university/technical level (11-13), and no
education.135 The fifth hypothesis in this study predicts that as the number of years spent
in school increases, women will be more liberal. Overall, the average number of school
years for Chilean women was 10th grade, or second year of high school. The highest
131

Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," Journal ofPolitical
Behavior,
Springer
132
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
133
Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the
World. Cambridge University Press: 91.
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135
The LAPOP name for this variable is Ed The exact wording of the educational level question is "Ahora
para terminar le voy hacer algunas preuntas para fines estadisticos.. .^Cualfoeel ultimo afto de ensenanza
que Ud. Aprob6?" What is the highest level of education attained?
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number of school years achieved by the majority of women was 12th grade, or completion
of high school.
To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the number of
school years and women's ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's
correlation test between school year and women's ideological orientation. Figure 7
suggests there is a relationship between school year and women's ideological orientation
and this relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as
the number of years spent in school increases, women are more liberal.

Figure 7: The Effect of Education on the Ideological Orientation of Chilean
Women

School years
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A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r
coefficient of. 114 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .01 level between
school years and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. As the number of years
spent in school increases, Chilean women are more liberal.
This study will shift to a focus of attitudinal variables and their relationship to the
ideological orientation of Chilean women. Women's attitudes toward the social issues of
divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, and abortion will be explored as potential factors in
the liberal orientation of Chilean women.
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CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF WOMEN'S ATTITUDES TOWARD SOCIAL ISSUES ON
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION
It has already been established which demographic variables have a significant
effect or relationship on the ideological orientation of Chilean women at the bivariate
level In this chapter the relationship between women's attitudes toward social issues and
women's ideological orientation will be explored
Attitudes toward abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and homosexuality have a strong
correlation in the explanation of ideology in the United States. Norrander and Wilcox
found that women's attitudes towards abortion were significantly related to their liberal
orientation. Attitudes and beliefs regarding social issues reinforce who women are likely
to vote for and what ideological orientation they are likely to choose While it may be the
case that ideology informs opinions in these issue areas, Norrander and Wilcox found that
the majority of Americans ideological identities are the product of their beliefs and
attitudes. When people think in ideological terms, their beliefs on social issues in
particular form the basis for their ideological tendencies. 136 While this study is unable to
establish causality, a limit of OLS analysis, there is evidence for why attitudes toward
social issues result in the adoption of a specific ideological identification. Norrander and
Wilcox examine theoretical considerations on gender and ideology by looking at how
women's stances on social issues impact their ideological identities over time. They find
evidence for their theory in Conover and Feldman's research. Conover and Feldman
136

Norrander, Barbara, and Clyde Wilcox (2007) "The Gender Gap in Ideology," Journal ofPolitical
Behavior, Springer.
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argued that people adopted ideological positions based on their stance on certain
issues.137 Norrander and Wilcox also examine the behavior of political elites as evidence
for why ideological positions are a consequence of attitudes toward social issues.
Political elites define the issues that are associated with a liberal and conservative
ideology.138 For example, Norrander and Wilcox argue that "elite positions connecting
pro-life attitudes to the conservative label" help Americans link their own attitudes to a
particular ideological tendency.139 Likewise, when political elites use the terms
conservative and liberal, people become more familiar with the terminology and start to
identify with one or the other ideological orientation.

140

Political elites "define" what it

means to be conservative or liberal by referring to "positions on concrete policy issues."
So while an ideological identification as conservative or liberal may cause people to have
certain attitudes on issues, research indicates that ideological orientation may also be a
consequence of issue positions.
The following set of hypotheses proposes that as positive attitudes towards the
justifiability of abortion, euthanasia, homosexuality, and divorce increase, women will be
more liberal. The null for these hypotheses is that there is no relationship between social
issues and the political orientation of women. The analysis below explains these
hypotheses.

Conover and Feldman (1981). The Origins and Meanings of Liberal/ Conservative Self-Identifications.
American Journal of Political Science, 25,617-645.
138
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
139
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
140
Norrander and Wilcox 2007
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Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Social Issues
Merike Blofield conducted some of the most influential research in examining
Chilean public opinion and attitudes towards abortion and divorce. She conducted
extensive field research in Chile for six months, interviewing key political actors and
both conservative and liberal legislators.141 Blofield concluded that the politics that
surround the issue of abortion remain highly conservative, despite the growing number of
illegal abortions.142 Within Chile the practice of abortion is not much different from
countries like the United States, but despite the occurrence it is still illegal. Likewise,
conservative senators "dominate the discourse" on moral issues "equating therapeutic
abortion with homicide, and divorce with the dissolution of national unity, poverty,
increased delinquency, and drug addiction." 143 Socialist leaders up to this point in time
have been ''timid" in confronting conservatives on moral issues.144 However, Blofield
finds that reform of social policies is linked with strong support for legalization of
divorce and abortion and support for leftist parties and a liberal ideology.
A 2002 survey of public opinion in Chile revealed that public support for the
legalization of divorce was at 85%. This strong public consent for the legalization of
divorce resulted in the passage of a conservative divorce jaw in 2004. In contrast to the
passage of the divorce law, the entrenched right-wing agenda has so far prevented there
from being a public discourse about the legalization of abortion.145
141

Blofield, Merike (2006) The Politics of'Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic Chile
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After analyzing the behavior of Chileans reflected in survey data, Blofield
concluded that Chilean behavior "deviates" significantly from being conservative on
divorce.142 Shefindsthat a majority of support existed for the legalization of divorce both
before, and after Chile became a democracy.

146

Table 1 below shows how since the

1980s there has been an increase in public support for the legalization of divorce, with
over 80% of the Chilean population believing divorce should be legalized. 147
Table 1: Percentage of Respondents Who Support Legal Divorce in Chile
Year

1987

1992

1996

2002

67%

67%

80%

80%

Favor Legal
Divorce

Sources: Blofield, Merike (2006) The Politics of'Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in
Catholic Chile since1990. New York: Routledge.

Blofield also finds that despite abortion remaining illegal, numerous women
continue to "resort" to having abortions in dangerous conditions.148 Every year over 94
abortions per capita are performed and death from abortion is the leading cause of
"maternal mortality" in Chile.149 Table 2 shows the percentage of public support for the
legalization of abortion in specific circumstances. Over 65% of Chileans agree abortion

Blofield 2006
Blofield 2006
Blofield 2006
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should be legalized in cases where the mother's life is at risk, and 58% believe abortion
should be legalized in cases of rape.150
Table 2: Support for Abortion in Chile
When...

1990

1996

1997

2002

75.3%

58.7%

75.6%

65.6%

—

47.7%

56.8%

58.3%

40.8%

32.6%

35.7%

56.3%

13.9%

10.7%

7.4%

21.3%

The mother's
life is in danger
Rape is
involved

Fetus
is deformed
Does not want
more children

Sources: Blofield, Merike (2006) The Politics of Moral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic
Chile since 1990. New York: Routledge.
- No data

In this research, attitudes toward social issues refer to how justifiable women
view the social behaviors of divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. This study
will operationalize attitudes toward social issues using the justifiability scale from the
2006 LAPOP dataset for how justifiable women view abortion, euthanasia, divorce, and
homosexuality. The justifiability scale asks respondents to rank how justifiable they view
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social behaviors to be on a scale from 1-10 where 1 is coded for never justifiable and 10
is coded for always justifiable.151
The Justifiability of Abortion
The first attitudinal hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes
towards the justifiability of abortion increase, women will be more liberal The research
conducted by Blofield suggested that a liberal ideology or support for leftist parties in
Chile was associated with social support for the legalization of abortion.
I argue that women who regard abortion as a justifiable social behavior have
shifted to the left ideologically. Despite the large amount of public support for abortion
legalization as indicated by Blofield, the lack of public discourse about abortion reform
has resulted in a smaller number of women who view abortion as a justifiable social
behavior. This may be the result of abortion remaining an illegal practice in Chile
Table 3 shows the percentage of Chilean women who view abortion as being a
never justifiable, justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. As of 2006, the
majority of Chilean women respondents view abortion as being a never justifiable social
behavior, and only 12.7% of women view abortion as always justifiable social behavior,
these findings indicate two possible conclusions. One indication might be that the
entrenched right-wing agenda has waged a successful campaign in linking abortion with
crime and bad social behavior. This is then reflected in the opinions of respondents.

5

The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI14A-CHI14G. The exact wording of the social issue question
is "ahora, utilizando tambten una escala de 1 a 10, le voy a pedir que usted me diga hasta que punto cree
que las siguientes situaciones son justificables. En este caso, 1 indica que usted cree que la situaci6n nunca
se justiflca y 10 indica que usted cree que la situaci6n siempre se justifica. Entonces, ^Cuan justificable
piensa que es?" On the justifiability scalefrom1-10 where 1 is never justifiable and 10 is always
justifiable, how justifiable do you view the following social behaviors?
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Another indication may be that Chilean women are torn on the issue of abortion, either
because it is still illegal and considered to be a private matter in Chilean society,
preventing women from publically declaring it to be justifiable, or because the Catholic
Church continues to influence people's religious beliefs.
Table 3: Percent of Women Who View Abortion as a Justifiable Behavior
Never Justifiable

75.5%

Justifiable

12.7%

Always Justifiable

12.7%

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward
abortion and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a
Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of abortion and women's ideological
orientation. Figure 8 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view
abortion to be and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as
predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of
abortion increase, women are more liberal.
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Figure 8: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Abortion on their
Ideological Orientation

1 never
justifiable

T
2

10
always
justifiable

Justifiability scale of abortion

A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r
coefficient of .205 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level
between the justifiability of abortion and the political orientation of Chilean women and
this is in the same direction as predicted by the research hypothesis. As positive attitudes
toward the justifiability of abortion have increased, Chilean women are more liberal. It
could be the case that an ideological identification influences one's attitudes and beliefs
toward social behaviors like abortion. However, while causality cannot be determined
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with OLS analysis, Norrander and Wilcox found that ideological identities are shaped by
stances on social issues.
The Justifiability of Homosexuality
The second hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the
justifiability of homosexuality increase, women will be more liberal. Table 4 shows the
percentage of Chilean women who view homosexuality as being a never justifiable,
justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of women respondents
view homosexuality as being a never justifiable social behavior, and only 24.6% of
women view homosexuality as always justifiable social behavior. Thesefindingsindicate
that attitudes towards homosexuality like abortion are still very much conservative.
Table 4: Percent of Women Who View Homosexuality as a Justifiable Behavior
Never Justifiable

50.9%

Justifiable

24.5%

Always Justifiable

24.6%

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward
homosexuality and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a
Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of homosexuality and ideological selfidentification. Figure 9 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women
view homosexuality to be and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same
direction as predicted in the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes toward the
justifiability of homosexuality have increased, women are more liberal.
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Figure 9: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Homosexuality on
their Ideological Orientation

1 never
justifiable

Justifiability scale of homosexuality

A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r
coefficient of .240 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level
between the justifiability of homosexuality and the political ideology of Chilean women.
As positive attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality have increased, women
are more liberal.
The Justifiability of Euthanasia
The third hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the
justifiability of euthanasia increase, women will be more liberal. Table 5 shows the
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percentage of Chilean women who view euthanasia as being a never justifiable,
justifiable, and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of Chilean women
respondents view euthanasia as being a never justifiable social behavior, and only 30.7%
of women view euthanasia as always justifiable social behavior. These findings indicate
similar conclusions as thefindingsabout abortion and homosexuality.
Table 5: Percent of Women Who View Euthanasia as a Justifiable Behavior
Never Justifiable

54.2%

Justifiable

15.1%

Always Justifiable

30.7%

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes towards
euthanasia and the political orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a
Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of euthanasia and ideological orientation.
Figure 10 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view euthanasia
and their political orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the
research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia have
increased, women are more liberal.
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Figure 10: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Euthanasia on their
Ideological Orientation
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A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r
coefficient of .194 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level
between the justifiability of euthanasia and the political orientation of Chilean women.
As positive attitudes towards the justifiability of euthanasia have increased, women are
more liberal.
Justifiability of Divorce
The fourth hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards the
justifiability of divorce increase, women will be more liberal. The research conducted by

58

Blofield suggested that a liberal ideology or support for leftist parties is associated with
strong support for the legalization of divorce. I argue that changing attitudes towards
divorce resulted in an ideological shift to the left among Chilean women which in turn
created a strong public support for the legalization of divorce. Table 6 shows the
percentage of Chilean women who view divorce as being a never justifiable, justifiable,
and always justifiable social behavior. The majority of Chilean women respondents view
divorce as always justifiable social behavior, and 18.2% of women view divorce as a
justifiable social behavior
Thesefindingsindicate that there is widespread belief among Chilean women that
divorce is a justifiable social behavior. Despite the domination of the public discourse on
moral issues by conservative leaders, the election of leftwing presidential candidate
Lagos in 2000 was crucial in passing a comprehensive divorce law in 2004.152 High
levels of social support for reform of moral issues, and a larger government role in
providing basic services to Chileans may have contributed to a shift in the ideological
orientation of Chileans.153
Table 6: Percent of Women Who View Divorce as a Justifiable Behavior
Never Justifiable

29.1%

Justifiable

18.2%

Always Justifiable

52.8%

To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward
divorce and the ideological orientation of Chilean women, this research will utilize a
152

Blofield, Merike H. (2006) The Politics ofMoral Sin': A Study of Abortion and Divorce in Catholic
Chile
since 1990. New York: Routledge, 16.
153
Blofield 2006
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Pearson's correlation test between justifiability of divorce and ideological orientation.
Figure 11 suggests there is a relationship between how justifiable women view divorce
and their ideological orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in
the research hypothesis, as positive attitudes towards the justifiability of divorce have
increased, Chilean women are more liberal.

Figure 11: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Divorce on their
Ideological Orientation

1 never
justifiable

r

2

10
always
justifiable

Justifiability scale of divorce

A Pearson's correlation test further substantiates this finding. The Pearson's r
coefficient of .186 indicates that there is a significant relationship at the .001 level
between the justifiability of divorce and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. As
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positive attitudes towards the justifiability of divorce have increased, women are more
liberal.
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CHAPTER V
THE ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, AND WOMEN'S
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Thus far, women's attitudes toward social issues have had a profound effect on
women's ideological orientation in Chile and in explaining women's growing liberalism
In this chapter the relationship between women's attitudes towards government
intervention, the economy, and women's ideological orientation will be explored.
Inglehart and Norris began some of the more influential work examining the
relationship between government intervention in the economy and the gender gap in
voting.154 They conducted an analysis of survey questionnaires from the World Values
Survey in the United States.1S5 Respondents were asked on a scale from 1-10 where they
would place themselves when asked questions about government intervention. The first
question asked respondents whether they believed the government should take on more
responsibility to ensure everyone is provided for. Respondents were also asked whether
private ownership of business and industry should be increased. For both questions, (1)
indicated that respondents believed government ownership of business should increase,
and a (10) indicated that respondents believed private ownership of business should
156
;«,.«>.»-<»>
increase.

After analyzing the findings, Inglehart and Norris concluded that women in the
United States often "displayed relatively strong support" for government spending on the

154

Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris (2003) Rising Tide: Equality and Cultural Change Around the
World. Cambridge University Press: 81.
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welfare state and public services.157 Women were also more likely to support leftist
parties when these parties had been traditional proponents of a strong social safety net for
public services.158 Inglehart and Norris also concluded that women's favorable view on
an active role for the state may have been due to women being the primary beneficiaries
of government services such as pensions.159
The Present Economic Situation in Chile
The question of government intervention in the economy has been of paramount
importance in Chile.HistoricaHy, economic issues are what really mattered. This was the
main reason women joined conservatives to oust Allende, and Chilean society has
disagreed most strongly over the role of the state in the economy. Once Pinochet
overthrew Allende, Chile adopted a strong neo-liberal model, and the first democratic
governments assuaged conservative fears by promising not to touch the neoliberal
models. These models led to high economic growth but also high income inequality. As
of 2007, Chile has experienced numerous structural reforms including the strengthening
of social protection and a plan to reform the pension system.160 When Bachelet was
sworn in as Chile's first female president she vowed to continue to work toward
bolstering Chile's economic prosperity and eliminating the high level of income
inequality.161 Since being sworn into office in January 2006, Bachelet has maintained the

157
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free market policies that have been in place in Chile for decades.

She has also worked

to increase social spending in the areas of health care and education.1631 argue below that
women's attitudes towards government intervention in the economy are important and
influential factors in explaining why Chilean women are more liberal.
In this research, attitudes toward government intervention and the economy refers
to whether or not women agree with the following statements: the health care system
should remain the same, there should be an increase in taxes, and the income of people
should be equal. This study will operationalize attitudes toward government intervention
in the economy using a scale from the 2006 LAPOP dataset for whether or not women
agree with the above statements.164 The scale asks respondents to rank how much they
agree with the above statements on a scale from 1-10 where 1 is coded for do not agree
and 10 is coded for do agree.
Income Equality
The fifth hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes toward income
equality increase, the liberal orientation of Chilean women will also increase. To test the
null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward income equality and
women's ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test
between attitudes toward income equality and ideological orientation. Table 7 shows the

164

The LAPOP name for this variable is CHI13A-CHI13C. The exact wording used in the government
intervention question is, "Ahora me gustaria conocer su opini6n acerca de algunos asuntos mas especificos.
i,C6mo ubicaria su propia posici6n en la siguiente escala donde 1 indica que usted se encuentra
completamente en desacuerdo con la afirmacion y 10 qu6 usted se encuentra completamente de acuerdo
con la afinnacion?" On a scalefrom1-10 where 1 indicates that you do not agree with following statements
and 10 indicates you do agree where do you place yourself?
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income disparities that have existed in Chile since 1970. In 1995, the richest quintile
received 61% of consumed income, while the poorest quintile received only 3.5%.
Income disparity remains a severe problem under the Bachelet administration and
attitudes towards income equality may be reflected in Chilean women's ideological
orientation.
Table 7: Income Distribution in Chile (Percentage Share of Income)
Year

Highest percentage

Lowest percentage

1970

51.4

4.4

1980

-

"

1995

61.0

3.5

.

•

.

'

'

•

'

.

'

'

'

Sources: CEPAL, World Bank, and Chant, Sylvia, and Nkiki Craske (2003) Gender in Latin America. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, 51.
- No data

Figure 12 suggests there is a relationship between income equality and women's
ideological orientation. This relationship is in the same direction as predicted in the
research hypothesis; women who agree that incomes should be more equal will be more
liberal (r= 105, p<.01). Essentially, income quality means that people want incomes to be
more equal, and for the disparities between incomes to disappear.
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Figure 12: The Effect of Chilean Women's Attitudes toward Income Equality on
their Ideological Orientation

1do not
agree

10 very
much
agree

Do you agree that income should be more equal?

Health Care
The sixth hypothesis in this study predicts that women who agree that the health
care system should remain the same will be more liberal. To test the null hypothesis that
there is no relationship between women's attitudes towards health care and their
ideological orientation, this research will utilize a Pearson's correlation test between
health care and ideological orientation. A Pearson's correlation test shows that there is
not a significant relationship between women's agreement with health care remaining the
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same and women's ideological orientation (p=254). Figure 13 further illustrates this
trend.
Figure 13: The Effect of Women's Attitudes toward Health Care on their
Ideological Orientation

10 very

1 do not
agree

much

agree

Do you agree that the health care system should remain the same?

Women who agree that the health care system should remain the same are more
liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected. Interviewer response effects
such as social desirability may be why no significant correlation was found between
women's attitudes towards health care and the ideological orientation of Chilean women.
There is more consensus in Chile today regarding the economic model in place and this
may have affected how influential women's attitudes toward government intervention is
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on women's ideological tendencies. The lack of a relationship may also be due to other
factors being more influential than women's attitudes towards health care in explaining
Chilean women's liberal orientation
Raise Taxes
The seventh hypothesis in this study predicts that as positive attitudes towards
taxes being raised to fund social programs increase, Chilean women will be more liberal.
To test the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between attitudes toward raising
taxes to fund social programs and women's ideological orientation, this research will
utilize a Pearson's correlation test between raising taxes and ideological orientation. A
Pearson's correlation test shows that there is not a significant relationship between
women's agreement with the need to raise taxes to fund social programs and women's
ideological identification (p=258). Figure 14 further confirms this trend
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Figure 14: The Effect of Women's Attitudes toward Raising Taxes on their
Ideological Orientation

1 do not
agree

Do you agree that taxes should be raised to fund social programs?

As positive attitudes toward raising taxes to fund social programs have increased,
women did not become more liberal. The null hypothesis can therefore not be rejected.
Interviewer response effects such as social desirability may be why no significant
correlation was found between women's attitudes towards raising taxes to fund social
programs and the ideological orientation of Chilean women. The lack of a relationship
may also be due to other factors being more influential than women's attitudes towards
raising taxes to fond social programs in explaining Chilean women's liberal orientation.
Also, there is consensus today in Chile regarding the economic model. Perhaps this is
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why attitudes towards government intervention in the economy are less influential in
predicting women's ideological behavior.
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CHAPTER VI
PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Multivariate regression analysis will predict which of the significant variable(s)
best explain Chilean women's liberal orientation. Multivariate analysis is necessary to
test the hypotheses concerning structural and attitudinal factors together, modeling the
variables simultaneously. It is also imperative to hold some variables constant while
determining the significance of others, i.e., holding structural factors constant while
assessing impact of attitudinal Ones, and vice versa. Table 8 depicts how much influence
age, school years, religion, marital status, women's attitudes towards the justifiability of
abortion, divorce, euthanasia, homosexuality, and income equality have on women's
liberal orientation. The trimmed model includes only the significant variables 165
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Table 8: OLS Regression of Chilean Women's Ideological Orientation
Independent Variables
Constant
Marital Status
School Year

Age
Religion
Justifiability of Abortion
Justifiability of
Homosexuality
Justifiability of
Euthanasia
Justifiability of Divorce
Income Equality
Adjusted R Squared
N

Original Model
5.555***
(.683)
-.674**
(.241)
-.012
(.029)
-.014
(.008)
-.270
(.278)
.090*
(041)

Trimmed Model
4.881***
(.362)
-.966***
(-.203)

.115**
(.039)

.095**
(.036)
.042
(.034)
.028
(.033)
.087*
(.038)
.110
(2.551)
651

.129***
(.033)

.089*
(.038)
.103
(2.563)
655

An F test indicated that these models were significant at the .001 level. Coefficients are
unstandardized, with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
In the analysis of the original model age, school years, religion, attitudes towards
divorce, and attitudes toward euthanasia were not significant predictors of the ideological
orientation of Chilean women. These variables had no effect on the ideological
orientation of Chilean women and were dropped in the Trimmed Model.
The R2 value is interpreted as the percentage of variance explained by the
dependent variable. The Trimmed Model indicates that the Adjusted R2 value is. 103 with
a standard error estimate of 2.563. In the Trimmed Model the Adjusted R2 indicates that
about 10% of the variance in women's ideological orientation is explained by marital
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status, and attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion, homosexuality, and income
equality. Although the overall model is significantly statistic, it fails to predict 90% of the
variance in women's ideological orientation.
The ANOVA examines the significance of the model as a whole.166 The F test
indicates whether all the variables when tested together significantly predict women's
ideological orientation.167 The F test also indicates whether the variance explained by the
line is greater than the unexplained variance.168 The ANOVA shows that the F statistic of
19.842 is significant at the .001 level.169
Married women (or value coded as one) were (.966) less liberal than non-married
women. This finding is consistent with prior research that suggests married women are
more likely to self-identify as conservative then non-married women. Thisfindingis also
consistent with the findings in the second hypothesis. Women who are married are .966
less liberal than non-married women.
The t value for the justifiability of abortion is 2.957 and is significant at the .01
level. As women are more willing to justify abortion, they are more liberal. For every
one unit increase in the justifiability of abortion women are more liberal. While it is
impossible to determine causality when using survey data, the findings are strengthened
by prior research suggesting attitudes towards the justifiability of abortion and other
social issues are important indicators of women's ideological orientation.
The t value for the justifiability of homosexuality is 3.912 and is significant at the
.001 level. As women are more willing to justify homosexuality, they are more liberal.
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For every one unit increase in the justifiability of abortion women are more liberal.
Chilean women's attitudes towards the justifiability of homosexuality are a significant
predictor of their ideological orientation
The t value for women's attitudes towards income equality is 2.341 and is
significant at the 05 level. As women come to agree that incomes should be more equal,
they are more liberal. For every one unit increase in women agreeing that incomes
should be more equal women are more liberal. Chilean women's attitudes towards the
justifiability of homosexuality are a significant predictor of their ideological orientation.
The multivariate results show that the other independent variables were
insignificant predictors of the ideological orientation of Chilean women. However, in
order to say that they are theoretically important, this study addresses muticolliiiearity. it
may be that the independent variables are so strongly correlated with one another that the
impact they have on the ideological orientation of Chilean women is weakened. The
results from the pearson r correlation matrix found in Table 9 and 10 lead me to believe
that there is a presence of multicollinearity in this study. For example, it may be that
marital status is a predictor of ideology, but its effects are compromised by its high
correlation with whether or not a person belongs to a religious denomination.
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Table 9: MulticoUinearity

Marriage

Variables

Marriage Religion

Pearsonr

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
Religion

.131**

Pearsonr

Income

Pearsonr

.001

.840

.000

.000

1

-.081*

.114"

-.128**

.034

.003

.001

-.026

-.008

.493

.832

1

-.418**

-.081*

.840

.034

.532*'

.114**

-.026

.000

.003

.493

-.145**

-.128**

-.008

-.418"

.000

.001

•832

.000

Sig. (2-tailed)
Years of school Pearsonr

-.145**

,532

-.008

-.008

Pearsonr
Sig. (2-tailed)

Age

School

.131**

.001

Sig. (2-tailed)

Age

Income

Sig. (2-tailed)

.

l

.000
1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Variables

How justifiable
How
is
justifiable is
homosexuality? euthanasia?

How
justifiable is
abortion?

How justifiable is

Pearsonr

abortion?

Sig (2-tailed)

How justifiable is

Pearsonr

homosexuality?

Sig (2-tailed)

How justifiable is

Pearson r

euthanasia?

Sig. (2-tailed)

How justifiable is

Pearson r

divorce?

Sig. ^tailed)

1

.380"

How
justifiable is
divorce?

.380"

.419"

.331**

.000

.000

.000

1

.414"

.411**

.000

.000

1

.428**

.000
.419"

.414"

.000

.000

.331"

.411"

.428"

.000

.000

.000

'. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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.000
1

CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study has examined Chilean women's ideological orientation, as well as the
relationship between social demographics, attitudes towards social issues, and attitudes
toward government intervention in the economy. This analysis indicated that Chilean
women should not be pigeon-holed as staunch conservatives. Women's ideological
orientation in Chile is not radically different from that of men, according to the 2006
survey data. This study has also identified several factors that explain Chilean women's
ideological orientation today.
This research shows that social demographics have a small but significant affect
on the ideological identification of Chilean women/Similar to Norrander and Wilcox
findings in the U.S., married women in Chile are less likely to be liberal than their
unmarried counterparts. Norrander and Wilcox find that the effect of marriage on the
ideological identity of women has strengthened over time.170 A push for the legalization
of divorce by Chilean political elites in 2004, and an increase in the number of single
women, has led to an adoption of liberal social attitudes which has translated into a more
liberal identity. Single women are also less likely to espouse the same conservative
familial values that have penetrated Chilean society than their married counterparts.
Income was not a significant predictor of whether women were conservative or
liberal in Chile. This is interesting because Norrander and Wilcox found that the
influence of income on the ideological identities of women in the U.S. has declined over
time because there is less of an "ideological difference" between women of different
170

Norrander and Wilcox 2007
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income groups in the United States.

In Chile, because women have limited access to

formal employment opportunities, income disparities between women may be less
common. This may explain why income was not a significant predictor of women's
ideological identities
Women's attitudes towards abortion, divorce, euthanasia, and homosexuality
were found to be significant predictors of Chilean women's liberal ideological
orientation. This is not surprising given the contentious nature of divorce reform and the
debate over the legalization of abortion. These results also infer that stances on issues
feature prominently in whether or not someone adopts a liberal or conservative identity.
Interestingly, a statistically significant relationship was found between women's
attitudes towards income equality and their ideological orientation. This indicates that
women's attitudes towards government intervention and the economy may be a slight
factor in the liberal orientation of Chilean women. Women who viewed income equality
favorably were more liberal. This finding may be due to the large income disparities that
exist between Chilean women and men. Chilean women are less likely than men to have
access to formal employment opportunities. As a consequence, women may be more
likely to view income equality as a favorable reform program.
For the most part, women's stances on economic issues were unrelated to the
formation of their ideological identities. These findings are important because they
coincide with trends in the U.S. Norrander and Wilcoxfindthat the role of government in
providing jobs and economic security "are becoming less important" in the formation of

Norrander and Wilcox 2007
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"ideological identities" in the U.S.172 Also, while stances on economic issues are
becoming less important for men and women in the U.S. over time, they remain "one of
the stronger influences" on men's attitudes.173
Chilean women's stance on the issue of abortion featured more prominently in the
ideological divisions between liberals and conservatives in Chile and in the U.S.
Norrander and Wilcox found that a conservative identity in the United States was being
formed by attitudes on social issues. Those in opposition to abortion and those who
advocated limited rights for women were more likely to be conservative.174 This is
interesting because attitudes on women's rights may be undergoing a dramatic change in
Chile, leading Chileans to adopt a more liberal identity.
Historically in Chile, ideological divisions over the economic model have led to
the destruction of democracy and democratic institutions. What this research shows is
that there is now consensus between conservatives and liberals on the type of economic
model found in Chile and less consensus on social issues. What really divides
conservative and liberal Chileans today are the social issues. This bodes well for
democratic stability because a lack of consensus over economic issues has been a driving
reason for Chile's turbulent relationship with democracy.
This research adds to the existing body of literature about gender and ideology in
Latin America. Several findings indicate why Chilean women have shifted to the left and
now self-identify as liberal. While it does not examine every potential explanation of why
Chilean women have shifted to the left ideologically, it does address social

172
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demographics, women's attitudes toward government intervention, and women's
attitudes toward social issues.
This research also has great implications for Chilean women and their
participation in the political process. Presently, Chilean women have become bigger
players in politics than ever before. This may be because a more liberal ideological
identifications leads to changes in values regarding women's roles in society and politics.
Overwhelming support for Bachelet in Chile's presidential election implies not only that
ideological change ushers in democratic stability, but also that ideological change has
allowed women to become prominent actors in the Chilean political system. This study
shows that ideological change and identification in Chile really matters. As a doctor,
single mother, and a woman, socialist president Bachelet exemplifies what it means to be
a liberal woman in Chile today. More Chilean women may take a cue from Bachelet arid
become incredible political actors in the Chilean government and civil society. When
women secure their role in the Chilean political system, the likelihood that there will be
reform of existing social laws governing social behaviors increases.
This research may encourage future scholars to conduct similar studies examining
the relationship between women's attitudes towards economic issues, democracy, and the
ideological orientation of Chilean women, and Latin American women in general.
Additionally, the findings of this study may applicable in an examination of the
ideological orientation of women in other areas of the world such as in the Middle East
where women are known to be socially conservative. While Chile is a unique case, this
research may also lead to future research on the effects of demographics, attitudes toward
social issues, and attitudes towards government intervention on partisanship, vote choice,
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and the ideological orientation of men and women in other socially conservative Latin
American countries.
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